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I. ARGUMENT 
A. I.C. 5 55-313's Statement of Legislative Intent Prohibits Relocation. 
Statewide argues that LC. 5 55-313's Statement of Legislative Intent does not prohibit 
relocation because: (1) the language of I.C. 5 55-313 is unambiguous and therefore this Court 
should not collsider the Statement of Legislative Intent; and (2) the Statement of Legislative 
Intent itself does not prohibit relocation in this case. Statewide is incorrect on both points. 
1. This Court may properly look to legislative history and the Statement of 
Legislative Intent. 
Statewide argues that I.C. 5 55-313 is unambiguous and, therefore, this Court is not 
permitted to loolc at the Statement of Legislative Intent issued by the legislature. A finding of 
ambiguity however, is not the sole ground for loolcing at a statute's legislative history and the 
legislature's intent for enacting the statute. This Co~ut  should, as it has in the past in other cases, 
loolc at I.C. $ 55-313's Statement of Legislative Intent in ascertaining what the legislature 
intended when it enacted this statute. 
This Court has held that its "primary duty in interpreting a statute is to give effect to the 
legislative intent as ascertained from the statutory language. Ag Services of Ainevica, Iizc. v. 
Icechter ex rel. Keclztev, 137 Idaho 62, 64, 44 P.3d 11 17, 11 19 (2002) (citing Adamson v. 
Blaizcharcl, 133 Idaho 602, 990 P.2d 1213 (1999)). "The Co~lrt may also seek edificatior from 
the statute's legislative history and the historical context in which it was enacted." Id. 111 
addition, this Court has held that "[a] statute need not be ambiguous in order for this Court to 
examine the legislature's intent in enacting it." Ada County Bcl. of Equalization v. Higl~laizcls, 
Iizc., 141 Idaho 202,207, 108 P.3d 349, 354 (2005). 
In State v. Stover, 140 Ida110 927, 104 P.3d 969 (2005), this Court found the language of 
I.C. 5 19-2521 to be unambiguous, but still recognized the importance of reviewing legislative 
history. The Stover court held, "[allthough there is no ambiguity in I.C. 5 19-2521, the 
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legislative history is instructive to show the Idaho Legislature did not intend to enact a 
sentencing scheme contemplated in Blakely." Stover at Idaho 931-932, P.3d at 973-974 
(underlining added) 
In this case, the legislative history of LC. ;? 55-313 is found in the 1985 Agricultural 
Affairs Committee meeting millutes for House Bill 264 ("H 264'7, which explains the reasons 
for creating the Statement of Legislative Intent for the statute. Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 126. A review 
of the meeting minutes provides a compelling reason for this Court not to disregard tile 
Statement of Legislative Intent. The meeting minutes of the Agricultural Affairs Committee 
reads in its entirety: 
H 264 
Permits the land owner to relocate right of access roads across farm lands to other areas 
of his land which will cause less damage and still provide public access. 
Reoresentative JoAn Wood spoke to this bill, saying it came from the Idaho State Wheat 
Growers and refers to erosion of old roads. The relocation would be at the property 
owner's expense. 
Mr. Manning expressed concern with the possible effects on highway access. He feels 
this could allow someone to move access roads without checking with the highway 
district or ITD. It could endanger the public or users of the land. 
Mr. Ray Oliver expressed the same concerns as Mr. Manning. 111 response to a questiou 
by Senator Beitelspacher, Mr. Oliver said it costs ll~indreds of dollars to relocate culverts. 
Mr. Paul Wise, Land Title Association, said this bill offers problems to title people. The 
association doesn't disagree with the concept but it doesn't dispose of existing accesses 
and could then provide two accesses. In response to a question by Senator Thome, Mr. 
Wise said there is a way to file to rid self of abandoned right of way, but it is not 
specified in this legislation. 
Mr. Harland Blackburn, Idaho State Wheat Growers, appeared before the committee for a 
brief discussion. 
Mr. Mamling suggested the bill could be passed with a statement of legislative intent 
should there be a dispute in court. More discussion followed regarding the right of way. 
Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 127-128 
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The last minute entry addressing Mr. Manning's suggestion shows that the legislature 
intended for courts to read the Statement of Legislative Intent. The committee minutes indicate 
that the legislature, in its wisdom contemplated that LC. S 55-313 may be litigated, and wanted 
the courts to read what it intended in "a statement of legislative intent should there be a dispute 
in court." Id. The legislature recognized that the meaning of I.C. S 55-313's phrase "any access 
which is less than a public dedication" may be misconstrued or misunderstood. That 
phraseology is not a product of Appellants' interpretation, rather the legislature has provided this 
Court with its own interpretation of that phrase through the Statement of Legislation lntent. 
Appellants ask this Court to consider the significance of the legislature's efforts to provide 
appropriate direction in construing I.C. 4 55-313. 
2. The Statement of Legislative Intent prevents relocation of the easement. 
Statewide argues that the Statement of Legislative Intent does not prohibit relocation 
merely because the access "connects to" a public road. Statewide cites the district court's 
reasoning that all roads eventually lead to a public highway system and thereforethe legislature 
did not intend for a road to be considered "part of a public highway system" merely because it 
connected to it. The district court's reasoning on this point is based upon tile language of the 
Statement of Legislative Intent which reads: 
STATEMENT OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 
H 264 
It is the intent of the Legislature that the phrase "any access which is less than a 
public dedication" in H 264 shall not include any access that is part of a public 
highway system. 
Supp. R. Vol. I, p. 129 (quotations and bolding in the original). Based on that language, the 
district court reasoned: 
The Defendants argue that because the easement connects to a public road, it is part 
of the public highway system. However, this reading of the intent would make 
section 55-313 inapplicable in nearly all cases because virtually every easement that 
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allows use of motor vehicles eventually connects to the public highway system. 
Stated differently, just because a road connects to the public highway systein does not 
necessarily mean it is "part of a public highway system." 
R. Vol. I, 87. Statewide's argument and its reliance on the district court's reasoning is incorrect. 
The district court and Statewide focus on the phrase "part of a public highway system," 
but ignore the words preceding that phrase, which read in its entirety says, "shall not include any 
access that is part of a public highway system." The legislature knew that some accesses would 
be part of a public highway and some accesses would not. What is missing from Statewide's and 
the district court's analysis is what accesses, then, are part of a public highway system? 
In order to understand the use of the phrase "shall not include any access that is part of a 
public highway system" in the Statement of Legislative Intent, the question is, why did the 
legislature choose to include a statement of legislative intent? The answer is fouiid in the 
Agricultural Affairs Committee meeting minutes wherein Mr. Manning expressed concenis that 
individuals would try to use I.C. 5 55-313 to move access "without checking with" the highway 
district or the Idaho Department of Transportation aid, therefore, the bill should be passed with a 
statement of legislative intent. The meeting min~~tes  state in pertinent part: 
Mr. Manning expressed concern with the possible effects on highway access. He feels 
this could allow someone to move access roads without checking with the higliway 
district or ITD. It could endanger the public or users of the land. 
Mr. Manning suggested the bill could be passed with a statement of legislative intent 
should there be a dispute in court. More disc~~ssion followed regarding the right of way. 
Supp. R. Vol. 1, 128. 
When reading the meeting miiiutes together with the Statement of Legislative Intent, it is 
evident that an access that requires a landowner to "check with" the highway district or ITD is 
the type of access that is considered part of a public highway system. 
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As discussed in Appellants' opening brief, a highway district and the Idaho Departinent 
of Transportation ("ITD") have no authority/jurisdiction over the internal roads on private 
property, but both have statutory authority to control access onto public highways. The word 
"access" as used in I.C. 5 55-313 and in the Statement of Legislative Intent refers to a specific 
point used for entry and exit; it does not refer to the entire roadway. Blacks Law Dictionary 
defines access as ''[a111 opportunity or ability to enter, approach, pass to and from.. ." Blnclcs 
Law Dictiorznry (8th ed. 2004). A prior edition has also defined access in the context of real 
property law as denoting "the right vested in the owner of land which adjoins a road or other 
highway to go and return from his own land to the highway without obstruction.. .." Blnclcs Law 
Dictiorznv~i (6th ed. 1990). 
The Idaho Department of Transportation has statutory authority to "[dlesignate state 
highways, or parts of them, as controlled-access facilities and regulate, restrict or prohibit 
access to those highways.. ." I.C. 5 40-310(9) (emphasis added). This statutory power is further 
promulgated in IDAPA 39.03.42.200.1, which provides that "[tlo help preserve the llighways as 
constructed and provide responsible growth where allowed, any individual, business, or other 
entity planning to add, modify, relocate, maintain, or remove an encroachment on the State 
highway ... shall obtain a permit ...". 
Therefore, in the context of ITD's jurisdiction for exainple, unless an access enters or 
exits (i.e. encroaches) upon a State highway, a land owner need not obtain a pennit or otherwise 
"checl< with" ITD before moving an access. There is no other reasonable explanation for the 
phrase "part of a public highway system" when considered in the context of Mr. Manning's 
concerns. Put another way, individuals only need to "check with" a highway district andlor ITD 
if the access encroaches on a public roadway. If that is tile case, then I.C. § 55-313 cannot be 
used to relocate that type of' access. 
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In this case, Statewide does not dispute that the exiting easement accesses Sinylie Lane, 
which is a county public road. The existing easement includes an "access" that is part of the 
public highway system and therefore, pursuant to the express language of the Statement of 
Legislative Intent, I.C. 5 55-313 cannot be used to relocate the existing access regardless of how 
the access was created 
B. Appellants Have Suffered An Injury Under L.C. 9 55-313. 
Statewide argues that it may relocate the Old Easement because Appellants have not 
suffered an injury under the statute. Appellants maintain that relocation of an express easement 
without their consent is an injury because: (1) consent of both parties is required to move an 
express easement and, therefore, it is a per se injury when one party unilaterally moves the 
easement; (2) relocating the easement without Appellants' consent is a talcing of their property 
right, which requires that the talcing be made for a public purpose; Statewide's re1ocatio1-1 of the 
easement is made for a private purpose and therefore Appella~its have suffered an injury. In 
addition, Statewide argues that none of Appellants arguments on appeal support a finding that 
their constitutional rights have been violated and therefore Appellants. 
1. Unilateral relocation of an express easement is a per se injury under 1.C. § 
55-313. 
Statewide contends that Appellants' per se injury argument is illogical because as the 
district court reasoned, "if consent was required to relocate, the statute would simply say so." 
Statewide and the district court's reading of I.C. 3 55-313 is flawed, because their interpretation 
assumes that the statute was created to deal with easements, 
I.C. 3 55-313 reads: 
55-313. RELOCATION OF ACCESS. Where, for motor vehicle travel, any access 
which is less than a public dedication, has heretofore been or may hereafter be, 
constructed across private lands, the person or persons owning or controlling the private 
lands shall have the right at their own expense to change such access to any other part of 
the private lands, but such change must be made in such a manner as not to obstruct 
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inotor vehicle travel, or to otherwise illjure any person or persons using or interested in 
such access. 
While there is no express language in I.C. $ 55-313 that says a landowner inust obtain consent, 
the statute does say that relocatioll cannot take place if the relocation injures any person or 
persons using or interested in such access. 
LC. § 55-313's phrase "access constructed across private lands" can refer to a myriad of 
ways a private roadway is created. Contrary to Statewide's and the district court's reading of LC. 
$ 55-313 access can be established through other means other than an express easement. For 
example, this Court has recognized the right of a land owner to grant a license to others to enter 
their land but "[ilt is settled law that a license creates no estate in lands. Howes v. Barntoiz, 81 
P.  48, 49 (1905) see also, AMJUR Ease~nents $ 117 ("A license in real property is the 
permission or authority to engage in a particular act or series of acts upon the land of another 
without possessing an interest therein. It is a personal, revocable, and unassignable privilege, 
confel~ed either by writing or parol."). 
The determination of injury to persons using or having an interest in such access 
necessarily contemplates the nature of the access. If the roadway was created by a license that is 
freely revocable and creates no interest, it carnot be said that any party interested in the access 
will be injured upon relocation of the access without their consent. On the other hand, if the 
access was created through an express grant of an easement, it is a recog~iized interest and right 
in real property Sun Valley Land& Minevals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 138 Idaho 531, 547, 66 P.3d 798, 
802 (2003). Under that circumstance, as in this case, the servient estate owner ]nay not 
unilaterally relocate the easement without the dominant estate's consent. 
Statewide also argues that this Court should not follow the traditional view of easements 
as explained in the Arizona and Washington cases of Stanzatis v. Johnson, 71 Ariz.l34,224 P.2d 
201 ( k i z .  1950) and MacMeekin v. Low Income Housirzg Institute, Inc., 45 P.3d 570, 575 
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(Wash. Ct. App. 2002). In those cases, both courts have recognized that easements are property 
rights and therefore "easements, however created, ... are not subject to relocation absent the 
consent of both parties." MacMeekin at 207. Statewide, however, has not provided any 
compelling reason to this Court why Idaho should depart from the traditional view of easements, 
especially since this Court, like the courts in Arizona and Washington, has held that an easement 
is a recognized interest and right in real property. Sun Valley Land & Minerals, Inc. v. Hawkes, 
138 Idaho at 547,66 P.3d at 802. 
Statewide also asks this Court adopt Section 4.8(3) of the Restatement Third of Property, 
Servitudes, which allows a servient estate owner to unilaterally relocate a11 easement. The 
Restatement reads as follows: 
$4.8 Location, Relocation, And Dimensions Of A Servitude 
Except where the location and dimensions are determined by the instrument or 
circumstances surrounding creation of a servitude, they are determined as follows: 
( I )  The owner of the servient estate has the right within a reasonable time to specify a 
location that is reasonably suited to carry out the purpose of the servitude. 
(2) The dimensions are those reasonably necessary for enjoyment of the servitude. 
(3) Unless expressly denied by the terms of an easement, as defined in 1.2,  the 
owner of the servient estate is entitled to make reasonable changes in the locatioll or 
dimensions of an easement, at the servient owner's expense, to permit normal use or 
development of the servient estate, but only if the changes do not 
(a) sigilificantly lessen the utility of the easement, 
(b) increase the burdens on the owner of the easement in its use and 
enjoyment, or 
(c) frustrate the purpose for which the easement was created. 
Restatement (Third) of Property, Servitudes $4.8  (2000). 
Further, Statewide asks this court to apply subsection (3) regardless of the qualifying 
language contained in the opening paragraph of the restatement, "Except where the location and 
dimensions are determined by the instrument." In support of this proposition, Statewide directs 
this Court to comment f of the restatement. Comment f discusses the benefits to the servient 
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estate holder of allowing ul~ilateral relocation of the easement. What Statewide fails to address, 
however, is the last paragraph of comment f, which states: 
This s~tbsection adopts the civil-law rule that is in effect in Louisiana and a few other 
states. It rejects the rule espoused by the weight of authority in the United States--that 
the servient owner may not unilaterally relocate an easement. That rule resulted from 
applying the n ~ l e  that the easement owner (the owner of the domi~lant estate) cannot 
unilaterally change the location of an easement to cases involving attempts by the 
se~vient owner to change the location. 
Icl. 
In the current case, not only is the location of the easement in question gx~resslv set forth 
in Au~ellants' deeds, which in and of itself precludes the application of Section 4.8(3), Coininent 
f, which Statewide urges the C o ~ ~ r t  to consider, specificaIIy instructs this Court tllat Statewide's 
position is the minority position and in fact contrary to the "rule espoused by the weight of 
authority i11 the United States." Siinply put, if this Court agrees with Appellants that the law in 
Idaho follows the traditional/majority view (i.e. no ur~ilateral relocation of an express easement), 
then it is ;I per re injary under I.C. S 55-313 if the relocation of the access involves moving an 
express ex,,~illent without the dominant estate's consent 
Statewide directs this Court to the holding ill Benningeu v. DeuiJield, 142 Idaho 486, 129 
P.3d 1235 (2006) for the proposition that this Court somehow impliedly held that I.C. 5 55-313 
may be used to relocate an express easement because the trial court in that case peimitted a 
servient estate owiler to relocate an easement. Statewide admits that "the relocation issue was 
not one of the issues raised on appeal." (Respondent's Brief pg. 23). Therefore, the Benninger 
case has no precedential value in this case. 
2.  Statewide's unilateral relocation of the easement violates Appellants' 
constitutionat rights. 
Statewide argues that Appellants have failed to establish that a taking has occurred under 
Article I, Section 14 of the Idaho Constit~~tion a d the Fifth Alnendinent to the United States 
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Constitution. Further, Statewide argues that Appellants' due process rights were not violated 
when Statewide relocated the Old easement. Statewide is incorrect. 
i. Statewide's relocation amounts to a taking. 
Statewide argues that Appellants have not cited to any legal authority to s~~pport  their 
claim that the relocation of an easement constitutes a "taking" in violation of their constitntional 
rights. This Court has held that a "talting" is necessarily concerned with the nature and scope of 
the property allegedly infringed upon or denied. State ex vel. Evans v. Click, 102 Idaho 443, 
449, 631 P.2d 614, 620 (Idaho, 1981). In this case, Appellants have argued in their opening brief 
that Statewide's unilateral relocation of Appellants' easernent has the effect of vacating their 
easement, forever barring Appellants from exercising their right to ingress and egress over that 
specific portion of property identified and legally described in their deeds. (Appellants' Brief pg. 
17). 
It cannot be said that full denial to traverse over and across the Old easement area granted 
in Appellants' deeds is not a vacation of the easement or is otherwise a taking. A finding that 
Appellants will no longer be able to cross over the Old easement area is further supported by the 
fact that Statewide will be constructing lots over the Old easement area as illustrated in the plat 
map. See. Supp. R. Vol. I, 143. Additionally, Statewide has also modified the real property 
records in Valley Comity by recording the district co~~r t ' s  judgment in the real property records 
which effectively modified the Appellants' deeds. See. Supp. R. Vol. 111, 506 (Statewide sought 
an award of discretionary costs for certified copies of the judgment for recording with the Valley 
County Recorder's Office). It is this permanent deprivation to ingress and egress that amounts to 
a taking. 
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ii. Statewide's taking is not made for a public purpose. 
Statewide argues that its relocation of the Old easement meets the "p~tblic use" 
requirement for a talting because its relocation is in furtherance of economic development. 
Specifically, Statewide attempts to circumvent Appellants' reliance on Cohen v. Lnrseiz, 125 
Idaho 82, 867 P.2d 956 (1993) (held: a private party may not condemn the property of another 
for a purely private purpose) by citing to the United States Supreme Court holding in i<elo v. City 
ofNew Lorzdorz, Connecticut, 545 U.S. 469, 125 S.Ct. 2655 (2005). 
The U.S. Supreme Court held in Kelo that "a State may transfer property from one 
private party to another if future 'use by the public' is the purpose of the talcing." Thus, 
Statewide implies that because the relocation of this easement is made for a public use, the 
holding in Coherz is not violated. Statewide fails, however, to acltnowledge that the Idaho 
legislatrtre specifically abrogated the Kelo decision when it passed LC. $ 7-702A. That statute 
reads in pertinent part: 
7-701A LIMITATION ON EMINENT DOMAIN FOR PRIVATE PARTIES, 
URBAN RENEWAL OR ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES. 
(1) This section limits and restricts the use of elnillent domain undel- the laws of 
this state or local ordinance by the state of Idaho, its instrumentalities, political 
subdivisions, public agencies, or bodies corporate and politic of the state to 
condemil any interest in property in order to convey the condemned interest to a 
private interest or person as provided herein. 
(2) Eminent domain shall not be used to acquire private property: 
(a) For any alleged public use which is merely a pretext for the transfer of the 
condemiled property or any interest in that property to a private party; or 
(b) For the purpose of orornoting or effectuating economic development; 
provided however, that nothing herein shall affect the exercise of eminent 
domain. . . . 
I.C. 7-701A (underlining added) 
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Thus, Statewide's eco~lomic development argument to support a finding of "public use" 
through the Kelo decision is inapplicable in this State. Statewide's relocation of the Old 
easement is made for a purely private purpose; the development of Statewide's subdivision. The 
Idaho Legislature ~lullified Kelo and its effect in Idaho and Statewide cannot rely upon Kelo to 
overcome the clear constitutional implications if it is allowed to relocate the easement under I.C. 
C. In The Alternative, 1.C. 5 55-313 is Unconstitutional because Appellants are 
deprived due process to determine just compensation for a taking of its property 
right. 
Appellants have argued in the alternative that if this Court determines that I.C. S 55-313 
pennits a servient estate owner to relocate an express easement without the consent of the 
dominant estate, the statute is unconstitutional because it denies Appellants' due process rights 
for deternlination of payment of just compensation. 
Statewide provides two reasons why LC. 5 55-313 is not unconstitutional. First, 
Statewide argues that Appellants' due process rights to have just compensation determined 
before a talti~lg can occur because Appellants still have access to their property via the New 
easenlent roadway. 
As discussed above, the permanent deprivation of Appellants to use the Old easement 
location for ingress and egress is a "talting." If this Court agrees that Statewide's I-eiocation of 
the easement amounts to a "taking" then I.C. 3 55-313 is unconstitutional pursuant to the 
Yellowstone Pipe Line Co. v. Drwinmoizd, 77 Idaho 36, 287 P.2d 288 (1955) case. The 
Yellowstone decision held that where a statute grants a party possession of property under an 
order for possession prior to final determination of tlie case, and payment of just compensation, 
the statue is unconstitutional. 
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Moreover, Statewide's argument that Appellants have alternate access to their properties 
through use of the New easement does not remove the unconstitutional infirmity. The United 
States Supreme Court has held that "just compensation normally is to be measured by 'the 
market value of the property at the time of the taking contemporaneously paid in money."' Olson 
v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255, 54 S.Ct. 704, 708, 78 L.Ed. 1236 (1934). Appellants are 
entitled to payment of money, not an alternative access. Since I.C. 9 55-313 provides no 
meclianisrn for detennining the payment of money prior to the taking, the statute is 
unconstitutional. 
I). Genuine Issues of Material Pact Exist. 
Statewide argues that no genuine issues of material fact exist regarding Appellants' 
allegation that the New easementiroad, as currently configured, will create a less direct route to 
their parcels, which will require them to drive heavy equipment (often covered with mud, dirt 
and grime) through a residential street, and will create safety problems and concerns with 
residents who will live the area. Supp. R. Vol. I, pp. 118, 134, 140-41. Statewide states that the 
question of whether it is more of a direct route depends on whether Appellants are travelling 
from west to east. 
The direction of travel is not the only consideration to detennine whether all factual 
issues have been resolved by the trial court. There is no dispute that the New easement is not a 
straight line. The plat map in the record shows that the New easementiroad has a curve. 
Appellants have presented that they will have to drive heavy equipment around that curve. The 
district court failed to consider whether the heavy equipment, whether they be large snow plows, 
trailers, or even vehicles with wide turn radius can effectively negotiate the curve in the road. If 
Appellants cannot drive their heavy equipment over the New easementhoad as they did with the 
Old easementiroad, the issue of whether they have suffered an injury comes into play. 
APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF - 13 
Issues of fact exist with respect to Appellant Monkarsh's conceins that the new access 
posed safety problems. Supp. R. Vol. I, 18. Statewide argues that because Valley County issued 
a conditional use permit for the const~xction the new roadway, it is safe. However, the issuance 
of the conditional use permit does not establish that the new access is safer or as safe as the Old 
access. Appellants should have been pennitted to introduce evidence through expert testimony 
that the new access made it more difficult to see oncoming traffic 
11. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth in this Response Brief and the reasons set forlh in  Appellants' 
Brief, Appellants respectfully request this Court to reverse the district court's decisioil granting 
Statewide Constn~ctioi~, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment and with inst~xctions to grant 
Appellants' Cross-Motion for Summary J:;dgi~~e~?t 
DATEI) this . 5 day of April, 2010 
EVANS ICEANE LLP 
By y& vw--. 
Victor S. Villegas, Of The Firm 
Attorneys for Appellants 
Lonnie & Charleile King, 
Sequoia Pietri, Luke Crawford, 
Maggie Crawford, jiin Crawford, 
Larry Mo~llcarsh 
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